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TAKING THE TIME TO DISCRIMINATE - R (ON THE APPLICATION OF 
STEINFELD AND KEIDAN) v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT [2018] UKSC 32 
 
Keywords: Civil Partnerships – Marriage – European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, Articles 8 and 14 – Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The campaign for equal civil partnerships recently won a decisive victory in the Supreme 
Court. After four years of litigation, a unanimous Court in R (on the application of Steinfeld 
and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development [2018] UKSC 32 declared that 
the current ban on different-sex civil partnerships, contained within sections 1 and 3 of the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004, was incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
 
The background to this appeal has been comprehensively analysed elsewhere (see Wintemute, 
2016; Bendall, 2017; Hayward, 2017). Steinfeld and Keidan are a different-sex couple with 
two children that wish to enter a civil partnership owing to an ideological opposition to 
marriage, which they view as a patriarchal and outdated institution. The litigants were 
unsuccessful in the High Court after Andrews J determined that their claim did not fall within 
the ambit of Article 8. Whilst it was accepted in the Court of Appeal that their claim did fall 
within the ambit of that article and that their inability to register a civil partnership constituted 
discriminatory treatment, a 2:1 majority held that the need for the Secretary of State to conduct 
further research in this area rendered such difference in treatment justifiable.  
 
In the Supreme Court, Lord Kerr, with whom all the other justices agreed, gave the main 
judgment. The Court determined that the appellant’s claim fell within the ambit of Article 8, 
which is unsurprising in light of the earlier reasoning of the Court of Appeal and a similar 
approach recently adopted at Strasbourg in Ratzenböck and Seydl v Austria [2017] ECHR 947. 
More importantly, the Court rectified the earlier erroneous view, stemming from M v Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11, that an adverse effect was needed before an 
infringement could fall within its ambit. Whilst not developing the point further than merely 
saying that no detriment needs to be established or engaging with Arden LJ’s novel attempt in 
the Court of Appeal to distinguish M based on negative and positive obligations, this move 
finally brings the domestic position in line with that at Strasbourg (see Fenton-Glynn, 2016).  
 
The key focus of the case was justification. The Secretary of State’s approach was comprised 
of two strands, the first of which was that any change to the law in this sensitive area of social 
policy fell squarely within the remit of Parliament. This necessitated a ‘significant measure of 
discretion’ to be afforded to both the government and Parliament as to the timing of any 
legislative change (para. 27). The second strand was that after the introduction of same-sex 
marriage in March 2014, the government was presented with a choice of either phasing out or 
extending civil partnerships to different-sex couples. In these circumstances, a ‘sensible 
course’ was to undertake further research as ‘[m]omentous decisions of this type need…time 
for proper inquiry and consideration’ (para. 25).  
 
The Supreme Court systematically dismantled the Secretary of State’s arguments. Citing In re 
G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2009] 1 AC 173, the Court emphasised that the margin of 
appreciation does not apply at a domestic level and even if a domestic equivalent did in fact 
operate it must be drawn narrowly in light of the fact that distinctions were based on sexual 
orientation. Adopting this rigorous approach, the Court accepted that the government knew that 
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the effect of introducing same-sex marriage was inequality between same- and different-sex 
couples. Distinguishing the position in Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2010) 53 EHRR 20 where 
the Austrian legislature, responding to changing societal views, introduced registered 
partnerships to remove discrimination against same-sex couples, the Court found that 
Parliament in England and Wales had instead deliberately created a new inequality ‘where none 
had previously existed’ (para. 36). Thus, as Lord Kerr bluntly stated: ‘to create a situation of 
inequality and then ask for the indulgence of time - in this case several years - as to how that 
inequality is to be cured is, to say the least, less obviously deserving of a margin of discretion’ 
(para. 36). 
 
The Court then adopted the four-stage test designed to establish whether an interference with 
a qualified Convention right can be justified. First, it needed to be assessed whether the 
legislative objective (legitimate aim) was sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right. Here, the Secretary of State actually conceded that the difference in 
treatment could not be justified but sought, in Lord Kerr’s opinion, ‘tolerance of the 
discrimination’ which unsurprisingly ‘cannot be characterised as a legitimate aim’ (para. 42). 
Second, a finding that the aim was not legitimate meant that there inevitably was no rational 
connection between the measure and the objective behind it. Third, less intrusive means were 
available whilst further research on civil partnerships was being undertaken such as deferring 
the introduction of same-sex marriage, extending civil partnerships to different-sex couples or 
pausing all access to the civil partnership scheme. For Lord Kerr, ‘[e]ach of these options would 
have allowed the aim to be pursued with less, indeed no, discriminatory impact’ (para. 49). 
Fourth, a fair balance was not struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of 
the community. Denying different-sex couples rights for an ‘indefinite period’ and with an end 
still not in sight has ‘far reaching consequences for those who wish to avail of them – and who 
are entitled to assert them – now’ (para. 52). Ultimately, Lord Kerr wished to ‘make it 
unequivocally clear that the government had to eliminate the inequality of treatment 
immediately’ (para. 50). Phasing out or extending civil partnerships the moment same-sex 
marriage was introduced were options but taking time to evaluate which path to take ‘could 
never amount to a legitimate aim for the continuance of the discrimination’ (para. 50). 
Resultantly, the Supreme Court issued a declaration that relevant sections of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 precluding access to different-sex couples were incompatible with 
Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. 
 
Three points can be made as to the significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Steinfeld 
and Keidan. First, the judicial reasoning is rigorous, succinct and, at times, surprisingly 
forthright suggesting that the Supreme Court found the Secretary of State’s arguments far from 
persuasive. For example, Lord Kerr stated, in a strikingly acerbic manner, that the government 
knew that it was perpetrating unequal treatment but had approached the issue with ‘at best, an 
attitude of some insouciance’ (para. 33). Similarly, Lord Kerr remarked that public 
consultations on the future of civil partnerships had not only been initiated for reasons 
‘unconnected with the government’s perceptions of its obligations under ECHR’ (para. 34), 
but also had asked the wrong questions (see generally Scherpe and Hayward, 2017). Thus, 
interviewing current same-sex civil partners to better understand their views on civil 
partnership and marriage was ‘at best, of dubious relevance to the question of whether the 
continuing discrimination against different sex couples can be defended’ (para. 53).  
 
Second, the decision to issue a declaration of incompatibility is important and can be 
juxtaposed against a recent reluctance of the Supreme Court to use this particular device. It 
goes without saying that a declaration does not oblige action and Steinfeld and Keidan remain 
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unable to register a civil partnership. Indeed, Lord Kerr was particularly keen to stress that a 
declaration merely acts as a formal record of an incompatibility with the Convention (para. 61). 
However, the significance of Steinfeld lies not necessarily in the fact a declaration was issued 
but rather the accompanying language and overall tenor of the judgment. Lord Kerr believed 
that the Court should not feel ‘in any way reticent’ about issuing a declaration and even went 
so far to say that the particular circumstances of the case meant it would be ‘wrong’ to refuse 
to do so (para. 61). It is thus clear that the Supreme Court sought, and in the strongest terms 
possible, to motivate the government to act whilst simultaneously respecting the constitutional 
boundaries created by the Human Rights Act 1998. That message has been received by the 
government as Theresa May PM announced at the Conservative Party Conference in October 
2018 that different-sex civil partnerships will be introduced, albeit without providing a 
timetable for reform. The move was justified on the basis of protecting couples ‘who want to 
commit, want to formalise their relationship but don’t necessarily want to get married’ (see 
Oppenheim, 2018).  
 
Third, whilst the Supreme Court left open as potential reform options both phasing out and 
extension of the regime to different-sex couples, it is now clear that the government is 
favouring the latter course of action. This choice is to be welcomed especially in light of recent 
statistics showing continued support for same-sex civil partnerships in spite of the availability, 
since March 2014, of same-sex marriage (see Office for National Statistics, 2018). However, 
with Theresa May PM framing the move as one where relationship commitment is to be 
recognised through formalisation, there is a real risk that future reform might further 
marginalise cohabiting couples that do not wish to marry or enter a civil partnership. Steinfeld 
has clearly helped pave the way for civil partnerships becoming available to all, but it is hoped 
that it might also prompt a wider review of the regulation of adult relationships, especially in 
relation to introducing much-needed legal protections for cohabitants. 
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